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Introduction
In the decade since the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, concerns about the extent and quality of 
cultural diversity in the United Kingdom have deepened and intensified. Along with other western 
states, high-profile debates have been taking place about integration, about values, about who can 
belong and claim citizenship, and about who is to be excluded. The construction of such boundaries 
is what Yuval-Davis (2011) refers to as the politics of belonging. These constructions are contested and 
requirements for belonging can and do change over time such that the meanings and conceptions of 
‘national identity’ are in constant flux. The way in which certain collectives, in this case migrants, are 
understood and positioned changes as these constructions change. In the United Kingdom, Yuval-Davis 
(2011) identifies New Labour’s shared common values as the most recent political project of belonging 
for migrants. First articulated in 2002 after the riots in the north of England and amidst concerns 
about social segregation between different ethnic communities, the UK government expressed the 
need for ‘common values’ and ‘a shared civic identity to unite around’ (Home Office 2002, 10). Here 
belonging is constructed out of solidarity and loyalty to Britain, and in particular to a set of shared 
and normative values.
This most recent project of belonging was articulated in the Nationality Immigration and Asylum 
Act (Home Office 2002), which introduced language and citizenship testing for immigrants who wish 
to apply to become British citizens. It can be seen as part of the government’s attempt to stabilise and 
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secure collective identity in the face of rapid social change and growing public and media concern 
with immigration and Muslim ‘extremism’.
The United Kingdom, along with other states in the Global North, operates an intricate system 
of immigration statuses with attendant entitlements and exclusions. The increasing differentiation 
of migrant categories – labour (skilled and unskilled), family, asylum seekers, refugees and students 
– has given rise to a hierarchy of civic stratification with, on entry, each category being afforded 
different rights and levels of protection by the state (Kofman 2002; Morris 2003). I suggest here that 
the citizenship regime operates as an additional mechanism of stratification which is activated where 
immigration controls have failed to limit the entry and settlement of migrants that the state does 
not wish to acknowledge or to recognise as politically belonging. It represents the third entrance in 
Hammar’s (1990) typology of gateways through which immigrants must pass on their journey to 
citizenship. The first gate is the regulation of immigration, which represents control at the border; for 
example, by granting work or study visas and residency for short periods. Migrants in this category 
risk being forced to leave if they become unemployed or when their studies finish. The second is the 
regulation of the status of permanent resident, which gives individuals the right to legally remain 
without time restrictions or the need for prolongation. The third and final gateway is to naturalisation 
and the granting of full citizenship; this entitles successful applicants the right to a British passport, 
unrestricted travel to and from the United Kingdom, the right to vote and the right to hold public 
office. The introduction of citizenship testing represents a restriction on who can pass through this 
third gateway, and the construction of what Hammar calls ‘denizens’: a category who have legal and 
permanent residence status, but who remain ‘aliens’ or foreign citizens. Denizens do not enjoy full 
membership of the state and are denied the formal political belonging which accompanies becoming 
a British citizen. Since their introduction in 2005, the UK language and citizenship requirements 
have changed quite significantly, further narrowing the door to formal citizenship and enabling the 
government to cherry pick which migrants can become citizens.
In the following I trace the evolution of these measures and how stratified belonging has been 
constructed through changing the language and literacy requirements, through the nature of the test 
and through the promotion of particular modes of citizenship. I support my argument by drawing 
on Home Office data showing the impact of recent changes to the test on the pass rates of different 
nationality groups. The final section considers migration and citizenship as deeply gendered processes 
which both produce and reproduce inequalities. I develop and deepen the critique of citizenship artic-
ulated in the citizenship regime to argue that it marginalises and excludes the identities, experiences 
and citizenship practices of migrant women.
The evolution of the British citizenship test
Since November 2005 all applicants1 wishing to settle permanently in the United Kingdom (indefinite 
leave to remain) or to become naturalised British citizens must successfully demonstrate English 
language proficiency and knowledge about British culture, institutions and traditions. When first 
introduced, the Knowledge of Language and Life requirement could be achieved through one of two 
ways. One involved completing the English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) speaking and 
listening qualification at Entry Levels 1, 2 or 3 using specified citizenship-based teaching materials. 
The applicant must have studied at an accredited institution and demonstrated progression from one 
ESOL level to the next. Alternatively, the requirement could be achieved through passing the com-
puter-based Life in the UK test, based on an official handbook and set at an English level equivalent 
of B1/Entry 3 (intermediate level) on the Common European Framework of Reference for languages. 
The first option offered English language teaching which included ‘teaching material based on the 
concept of citizenship’ (Home Office 2004, 5). The curriculum included topics such as British his-
tory and constitution, women’s changing role in society, immigration, multiculturalism and practical 
information about living in Britain, such as housing and finance. Acquiring citizenship via this route 
involved demonstrating progression in learning English, rather than achievement of a pre-defined 
BriTisH JOUrnaL Of sOciOLOgy Of eDUcaTiOn  3
standard. However, from 28 October 2013 the requirements for both indefinite leave to remain and 
citizenship changed: the ESOL and citizenship certificate route was removed and instead all applicants 
must now pass the computer-based Life in the UK test and must meet more stringent English language 
requirements; that is, have a speaking and listening qualification in English at B1/Entry 3 Common 
European Framework of Reference for languages or higher (Home Office 2013a).
The test currently costs £50 and comprises 24 multiple-choice questions which must be answered 
within 45 minutes; 75% of questions must be answered correctly in order to pass. It is available through 
test centres operated by learndirect on behalf of the UK Home Office. The third edition of the official 
handbook, Life in the UK: A Guide for New Residents, was launched on 25 March 2013; this latest 
edition is significantly different from the earlier two versions. There is comparatively little substantive 
difference between the first and second editions; the second edition published in 2007 mainly consists 
of updated and revised content and a new final chapter which presents the official understanding of 
good citizenship and how to become a ‘good citizen’ (Home Office 2007, 107–108). This reflected the 
government’s increasing emphasis on the duties and responsibilities of citizenship which later emerged 
in the notion of ‘earned citizenship’ (Morrice 2011). The third edition, however, is substantially dif-
ferent. Although all three editions contain information about British history, culture and law, in the 
earlier two editions this did not form part of the test and was included for its ‘interest and practical 
value’ (Home Office 2007, 4). There was also explicit acknowledgment that historical knowledge is 
contested and subject to interpretation; so the first edition stated that ‘[a]ny account of British history 
is, however, whether long or short, an interpretation. No one person would agree with another what 
to put in, what to leave out, and how to say it’ (Home Office 2004, 17). The statement in the second 
edition is somewhat weaker: ‘[h]istorians often disagree about what to include and what to exclude 
in historical accounts’ (Home Office 2007, 7). By the third edition all reference to possible alternative 
accounts or dialogue is removed and instead, under the chapter heading of ‘A long and industrious 
history’, one single and enduring national narrative is presented as universally shared and undisputed. 
There is also considerably more detail about British history, historical figures, arts and culture, all of 
which are now subject to forming a part of the multiple-choice questions which make up the test.
In the earlier editions the rights and responsibilities of being a citizen and the notion of common 
values are set out relatively tentatively in the final chapter: ‘… most people believe that there should 
be a set of shared values with which everyone can agree’ (Home Office 2007, 107). Reference is made 
to surveys that suggest what the majority of people think about the rights and responsibilities of being 
a citizen, and this section is not included in the test. In contrast, the third edition sets out values and 
principles in the opening pages, and in much stronger, normative language: ‘British society is founded 
on fundamental values and principles which all those living in the UK should respect and support’ 
(Home Office 2013a, 7). The other main difference is that the first two editions contained sources of 
practical information and a large glossary of terms to help readers understand the meanings of key 
words and expressions. The sources of information were about: education, such as types of schools, the 
national curriculum, qualifications and universities, and the system for getting overseas qualifications 
recognised in the United Kingdom; information about healthcare such as how to register with a general 
practitioner; and also information about money and credit, public utilities, accessing public libraries 
and Citizens Advice Bureaus. The first edition claimed that the handbook is ‘essentially a compendium 
of useful information helpful to those new arrivals settling in to this country’ (Home Office 2004, 
10). It then repeats this aim ‘to be helpful to integration, not to set a rigid task, still less one designed 
to fail any definite percentage’ (2004, 13). This contrasts starkly to the information statement in the 
third edition, which states that the handbook ‘… will help you to integrate into society and play a 
full role in your local community. It will also help ensure that you have a broad general knowledge of 
the culture, laws and history of the UK’ (Home Office 2013a, 7). The glossary in the third edition is 
correspondingly significantly smaller.
In launching the new handbook and test, the UK Home Office claimed that it aims to put ‘British 
culture and history at the very heart of its revised curriculum’ (Home Office 2013c). The Immigration 
Minister, Mark Harper MP, announced the new test stating:
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We’ve stripped out mundane information about water meters, how to find train timetables, and using the internet. 
The new test rightly focuses on values and principles at the heart of being British. Instead of telling people how 
to claim benefits it encourages participation in British life (Home Office 2013c).
As the quote from the Minister suggests, the new handbook also includes guidance on approved forms 
of participation and citizenship.
The creation of denizens and non-citizens
The citizenship regime can be seen as an influential articulation of British national identity and stands 
at the third gateway in Hammar’s framework, restricting the doorway to belonging and the claim to 
British citizenship and identity. As already outlined, it is a technology which has become increasingly 
more severe over the past decade, with less room for critical engagement or debate, and with the 
knowledge of UK history, culture and institutions demanded generally recognised to be above and 
beyond that possessed by the majority of the long-term resident population. History and culture have 
been distilled to one simple story and diversities have become reduced to imagined commonalities. 
The expectation of engagement with written text and what has to be rote learnt has increased greatly, 
raising the bar for settlement in the UK ever higher. The eligible citizen must now demonstrate that 
they can read and interpret English texts, not just ‘hold a conversation on an unexpected topic, that is 
workable, though not perfect’ (Home Office 2004, 11); they must demonstrate that they are responsible 
citizens who ‘play a full role in [their] local community’ (Home Office 2013a, 7).
The UK government website (Home Office 2014a) offers practice tests which underscore the class 
bias and nature of the cultural understanding and also the language skills required. For example, 
candidates might be asked to select which of the following statements is correct:
•  Gilbert and Sullivan were a comedy double act.
•  Gilbert and Sullivan wrote many comic operas.
Or they could be asked to identify legislation or events in a particular time period, for example: 
‘Which TWO developments are associated with the “Swinging Sixties”?’
•  Children’s rights law reform.
•  Abortion law reform.
•  Divorce law reform.
•  Decimal currency.
There are no preparatory classes for the test, and the assumption is that applicants will have access 
to information technology equipment and the necessary information technology skills to enable them 
to practice using the online practice tests. Data gathered between 2005 and 2010, and therefore prior to 
the changes, showed significant variations in pass rates by nationality; English-speaking countries had 
the highest pass rates, and within this group there was considerable variation depending on the level 
of economic development of the country (Ryan 2010). More recent Home Office data released under 
a freedom of information request (Home Office 2014b) show a breakdown of pass rates by nationality 
between 2009 and 2014, and again indicates that citizens from non-English-speaking, low-income 
countries and countries with low literacy rates are disadvantaged in the test. What is also clear from 
the data is that the recent changes to the citizenship test have affected citizens from some countries 
more than others. Table 1 presents the pass rates for nine countries between January 2013 and February 
2014. During this time period the third edition of the handbook was introduced (25 March 2013) 
and the new test was implemented (28 October 2013). Countries have been selected for comparison 
on the basis of numbers of test applications, the wealth of the country (high, medium or low income 
as defined by the World Bank), literacy rates and whether or not English was an official language.
The countries with the highest pass rates are Australia, Canada and the United States (group 1). The 
average pass rate for these countries remained between 95 and 98% during the time period. The pass 
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rates were also relatively high for middle-income countries where an official language was English, such 
as Ghana, India and Nigeria (group 2). Although the pass rates dropped significantly over the period, 
nationals from these countries still averaged a 68–89% pass rate. However, other nationalities with a 
large number of migrants taking the test included Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Somalia (group 3); for 
this group the pass rate was predictably significantly lower – on average just 47% of Afghan applicants, 
57% of Bangladeshi applicants and 57% of Somali applicants passed the test between January 2013 and 
February 2014. This latter group of low-income countries also has some of the lowest adult literacy 
rates in the world (32% for Afghanistan, 58% for Bangladesh and 38% for Somalia) (UNESCO 2014). 
Female rates of literacy are lower than male rates in all of these countries, and although information 
Table 1. Knowledge of language and life in the uK pass rates between January 2013 and february 2014.








% change from 





 australia 99 97 97 −2 4122
 canada 97 95 93 −4 1761
 usa 98 96 96 −2 5655
 average 98 96 95 −3
group 2
 ghana 87 65 64 −23 3389
 india 90 76 71 −19 26,635
 nigeria 89 69 69 −20 10,709
 average 89 70 68 −21
group 3
 afghanistan 58 47 36 −22 1841
 Bangladesh 76 53 41 −35 5838
 somalia 74 50 47 −27 1479
 average 70 50 41 −28
Figure 1. Knowledge of language and life in the uK test results from January 2013 to february 2014. 
source: home office (2014b). 
Note: high = group 1; MEd = group 2; loW = group 3.
6  L. MOrrice
on gender and pass rates is not available, it is likely that women are even more likely to struggle with 
the language and literacy requirements of the test.
Figure 1 combines the monthly pass rates for each of the groups of countries. While the results for 
group 1 show very little change over this period (a drop of just 3%), the pass rates for the latter two 
groups drop significantly after the introduction of the new handbook in March 2013. The pass rates 
improve slightly and then drop again with the introduction of the new test. Group 2 pass rates show 
a much smaller dip and quickly appear to pick up, whereas group 3 shows a continual decline in pass 
rates. Between January 2013 and February 2014 the pass rates for group 2 dropped by 21% and those 
for group 3 by 28%.
Information on immigration category and pass rate is not available, but each of the countries in 
group 3 is either a country in which partner migration (most often women) is a significant share of 
settlement (Bangladesh) or has been a refugee-producing country in the recent past (Afghanistan 
and Somalia). These three countries were amongst the 10 nationalities most likely to have relied upon 
the ESOL with citizenship route (Ryan 2010). The ESOL route acknowledged that ESOL learners are 
extremely diverse and learning for those with little or no educational background is a much longer 
and slower process as they are learning how to learn and how to become literate at the same time as 
learning a language. For some learners, their own language may not use the Roman alphabet and they 
are learning a new script, and some may be learning that print conveys meaning. A range of other 
factors such as age, amount of study time and exposure to language outside class time also come into 
play. This diversity gives rise to wide variation in the number of hours and levels of support required to 
complete an ESOL qualification: for a learner starting at approximately Entry level 1 it can take more 
than a year to progress through each level (Kings and Casey 2013), and therefore over three years to 
reach Entry level 3, the benchmark required before citizenship can be applied for. Highly educated and 
proficient learners can reach this level in a fraction of this time. There has been a significant reduction 
in government funding for ESOL and changes to the mechanism used to determine funding which 
do not reflect the diversity of needs of ESOL learners (Kings and Casey 2013). This has made it more 
difficult for ESOL providers to deliver lower level classes which meet the needs of learners who require 
more time and support to complete a qualification (Kings and Casey 2013). In addition, changes to 
eligibility for concessionary fees have made women and low-paid workers particularly vulnerable to 
being unable to afford classes (NIACE 2011), placing restrictions on the ability of some migrants to 
access classes and undertake the sustained learning in order to reach Entry Level 3. A consequence of 
all of these changes to the citizenship test and the language requirements is that the educative purpose 
enshrined in the original intention of the Knowledge of Language and Life has been removed, and this 
has had greatest impact on the most vulnerable migrants and particularly women.
Finally, it should be noted that meeting the language requirements and passing the citizenship test 
is the first stage to acquiring British citizenship. Once these requirements have been met the migrants 
must pay a fee to submit their application, and answer a range of questions to evidence that they are 
of ‘good character’. The application cost has increased substantially since its introduction, from £200 
prior to 2007 to the current fee (April 2014) of £906 per person, plus £80 for the costs of the citizenship 
ceremony. Levesley (2008, 36) in his research report for Lord Goldsmith’s review of British citizenship 
found that the cost of applying for citizenship was the single most frequent obstacle to citizenship, 
and is likely to discriminate against women and low income migrants.
Migration and citizenship as gendered processes
Liberal citizenship regimes treat migrants as a homogeneous group and, by default, assume that those 
who are eligible to apply for citizenship can do so from a level playing field. As already argued, this 
fails to recognise the global hierarchy of nation-states and the inequalities this creates for different 
nationalities. In addition, within the global stratification of migration men and women do not circu-
late in the same way and gender is also an important dimension in explaining how citizenship rights 
are distributed (Tastsoglou and Dobrowolsky 2006; Piper 2008). More specifically, women are more 
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likely to enter the United Kingdom as family migrants and to experience dependent status (Kofman 
2002, 2004; Castles and Miller 2009), they are more likely to be employed in precarious and informal 
sectors (particularly domestic and care work), and in asylum claims they are more often treated as the 
dependent of the principal applicant (Kofman 2008). Migration is therefore a deeply gendered process: 
migrants leave gender-segmented societies, and on entry to the United Kingdom stratification and 
inequality is further produced through different migrant statuses; these intersect with other social 
divisions to shape the citizenship experiences, opportunities and outcomes for women, including their 
opportunities to successfully apply for citizenship.
The Life in the UK handbook underscores the state’s power to define the ideal citizen, the prac-
tices and meanings of citizenship, and consequently how citizenship is differentially experienced by 
different subjects. It reflects liberal western modes of citizenship which stress membership of a state, 
rights, responsibilities, equality and participation, particularly participation in the workforce, as being 
fundamental aspects of citizenship (Coare and Johnston 2004). The normative practices and dominant 
discourse that define mainstream culture are presented through citizenship ideals as not only being 
stable, but also culturally and gender neutral; it is assumed that all individuals are acknowledged and 
experience themselves as equally valuable citizens, regardless of social identity locations, and that all 
can and should participate in the public sphere on an equal basis. The two later editions of Life in the 
UK emphasise the importance of being a ‘good citizen’ and participating in the community through 
volunteering (Home Office 2013a, 153–161). The underlying presumption is that simply by declar-
ing participation in the workforce or community as a ‘good thing’ and an important aspect of being 
a citizen, this it is attainable and will naturally follow (Moosa-Mitha 2005). This conceptualisation 
skates over existing and deeply embedded power differentials in society, and, as suggested earlier, it 
ignores that some migrants might need more support to improve their English language, to navigate 
the employment market or to volunteer. It also fails to recognise that citizenship may be understood 
and practiced differently; consequently, migrant women may not recognise their own civic labour 
in the citizenship ideals promoted, and the citizen subject articulated may fail to have relevance or 
meaning for their lives.
Feminist scholars have demonstrated the contested nature of citizenship and the need for an 
expanded notion which recognises the differential experiences and practices of citizenship based on 
gender, sexuality, age, ethnicity, class and other social divisions (for example, Lister 1997; Yuval-Davis 
1997a, 1997b; Tastsoglou and Dobrowolsky 2006; Abraham et al. 2010). In particular they have the 
challenged the assumption of an abstract, undifferentiated universalism, and instead have put forward 
notions such as ‘differentiated universalism’ (Lister 1997), which point to the need for a framing and 
understanding of citizenship that encompasses an analysis of the reality of differences in praxis (for 
example, Abraham et al. 2010; Tastsoglou and Dobrowolsky 2006). Attention has been drawn to the 
ways citizenship has been essentially male defined, privileging the male sphere and marginalising 
women and other modes of citizenship (for example, Arnot 2009; Lister 1997; Yuval-Davis 1997a). 
Abraham et al. (2010) highlight the artificial binary between the public and private spheres and the 
importance of recognising the interdependence and interaction between these spheres, and, coupled 
with this, the need for an expanded notion of care in the conceptualisation of citizenship, particularly 
in relation to migrant women.
The citizenship practices set out in the handbook include examples such as helping in schools, 
becoming a blood or organ donor and volunteering with local services and charities. Participation in 
the community is presented largely in individualistic and secular terms, and yet studies have pointed 
to family, kinship, ethnic and community groups as key sites of agency and participatory citizenship 
for migrant women (Ralston 2006; Tastsoglou 2006; Williams 2010). Such studies highlight that civic 
identity and civic participation are not necessarily located in the spheres of volunteering for local 
charities or services, and that approved modes of practice may fail to connect or appear relevant to 
women’s lives. Of further relevance to migrant women’s identification with citizenship practices is 
the articulation of religion as a private matter and the public sphere as avowedly secular. One of five 
‘fundamental principles of British life’ is ‘[t]olerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’ (Home 
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Office 2013a, 8); religion and religious identity are accepted, but examples of volunteering or collec-
tive activities through a faith-based community are not included in the handbook, suggesting that 
they are not regarded as an equal or valued part of citizenship activity. Yet over the last two decades, 
faith-based identity has become a more salient reference point for many in Britain, most evidently 
for Muslims, but also for other minority ethnic groups such as Sikhs and Hindus (Modood 2010; 
Zavos 2009). Modood points out that what being a Muslim2 means varies from person to person and 
over space and time: the religious dimension is not necessarily the most prominent; it could be com-
munity, heritage, sense of family or collective political advancement which makes the identity more 
or less salient for an individual. It can also simply be some basic precepts about self and how to live 
one’s life; moreover, the separation between these different dimensions is not always clear cut in the 
lives of individuals (Modood 2010; Moosa-Mitha 2009). However, the British citizenship discourse 
puts forward one secular model of the good citizen to which all are expected to conform; Modood 
argues instead for a differentiated citizenship which recognises cultural difference and embraces plural 
ways of belonging (Modood 2005, 2007). He challenges the neutrality claimed by the state to argue 
that such state secularism represents ‘an arbitrary, if historically grounded bias against one kind of 
minority’ (Modood 2010, 123). The point is that for many citizens, whether newly arrived or long-
term resident, ethnic and faith-based activity can be a major source of community participation and 
an essential part of being a ‘good’ or responsible citizen. Ethnic, faith and faith-based ties can also 
provide the surest sense of being, of collective strength, pride and belonging; these loyalties give rise 
to strong civic identities and moral obligations. Recognition of these different layers – local, ethnic, 
national and transnational – requires what Yuval-Davis (1999) argues is a multi-layered construct of 
citizenship. Citizenship discourses which fail to recognise the ties and community activities based on 
faith ignore the different ways that participation is perceived and enacted by different individuals and 
groups; ultimately this restricts the state’s ability to recognise and address the social needs of faith-
based communities, but also does not allow certain groups to make themselves visible in a way which 
is most meaningful to their sense of self (Moosa-Mitha 2009).
It may not only be secular and individualised citizenship discourses which cause dis-identification 
and disrupts migrants’ sense of affinity and belonging to the United Kingdom. Migrants live transna-
tional lives and affective belonging is at the same time local, national and transnational (Tastsoglou 
2006; Yuval Davis 1999). Global politics and the role of powerful states in conflicts, both past and pres-
ent, impact on the sense of belonging and how migrants connect to historical narrative and discourses 
of citizenship. Gordan (2010) vividly describes the struggles of Laotian women refugees to connect 
their historical memories (which included US bombing of Laos) and their complex understandings 
of citizenship with US narratives of citizenship. Identification and sense of belonging may be difficult 
to achieve where different historical memories compete with selective historical narratives; such as in 
the Life in the UK handbook, where the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are narrated from a single 
and uncontested UK government perspective.
Conclusion
Drawing on Yuval-Davis’ notion of belonging as politically constructed, I have argued that the citi-
zenship regime has been incrementally tightening the borders around who can acquire British citi-
zenship and in doing so is constructing stratified tiers of belonging for migrants.3 In addition to an 
immigration policy which enables the government to cherry pick the most skilled and highly educated 
workforce from around the globe (Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman 2005), the citizenship regime, 
while appearing to be inclusive and open to all, is a silent and largely invisible filter enabling a second 
round of selection. This has given rise to a stratification of migrants from those at the top who expe-
rience least resistance and difficulty becoming British citizens; they are from the most privileged and 
wealthiest parts of the globe; they are the most literate, are well educated and are most likely to be 
from a westernised socio-cultural background where modes of citizenship are broadly similar. Then 
there are the less-deserving migrants at the bottom who have the right to stay in the United Kingdom 
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and are eligible to apply for formal citizenship, but whose entitlement cannot be realised in practice. 
These migrants, whose cultural differences cannot be reconciled, remain in an anxious liminal space 
of exclusion and non-citizenship: tolerated but not rewarded with the coveted status of citizen-
ship. These are the most vulnerable migrants from the poorest parts of the globe, who have had 
the least education and opportunities and whose social and cultural background has not prepared 
them for the cultural-specific nature of the test and the rote learning of written texts. Alongside 
this cultural bias, the regime has a largely unacknowledged gender bias which makes women par-
ticularly vulnerable to exclusion because they not only have the lowest literacy levels, but tend to 
occupy the most vulnerable migrant statuses, are less likely to be able to access ESOL classes, have 
fewer financial resources and are more likely to be engaged in unrecognised and unacknowledged 
citizenship practices.
The citizenship regime speaks to the fears and anxieties running through public discourses that 
British national identity is under threat from without, and in particular from growing cultural diversity. 
This is clearly seen in the way in which migration has become a major policy issue and was one of the 
single most important issues in the UK general election in May 2015. The discourse of Britishness is 
articulated by politicians and policy-makers in an attempt to reassure a concerned public that action 
is being taken, that there is a set of fundamental values and a shared civic identity around which the 
long-term settled population is already united, and that newcomers can be required to sign up to 
and yet have no role in shaping. This entrenchment and essentialist notion of national identity is far 
removed from the discourses and debates sparked by the Parekh Report at the cusp of the millennium 
in which Britain was imagined and celebrated as being inherently multicultural and even a hybrid 
nation (Runnymede 2000). In these debates it was argued that Britain needed to revise its national 
story and its identity in order to move towards a more inclusive society which recognised its diverse 
cultural communities.
The forms of citizenship and values promoted are western ones of individuality, personal suf-
ficiency and an independently orientated self which contrasts with other cultural understandings 
of self and social context that stress more collective, community and family-orientated modes 
of self and of being a good citizen. These identifications and engagements give rise to different 
spheres of civic agency and types of action; they do not conflict with the more impersonal and 
secular civic identities set out in the official handbook, but they are not recognised within the 
model of good citizenship set out. The argument presented here suggests there is a need to 
recognise these contested understandings and to engage in debate, rather than overlay a veneer 
of shared and imaginary understanding in an attempt to iron out socio-cultural differences, 
divisions and inequalities. After all, the act of taking and passing a test does not guarantee 
that individuals will feel integrated, they will not hold extreme views or that they will not feel 
alienated. It merely confirms that they can read and memorise certain facts, ideas and modes 
of citizenship.
Notes
1.  All adults between 18 and 65 applying for settlement, whether as the main applicant or a dependant, are expected 
to meet the requirement. There are some exemptions; for example, those who have a mental or physical condition 
which ‘severely inhibits’ their ability to communicate, and spouses of British citizens who have been the victims 
of domestic violence and refugees. However, the requirement for naturalisation as a British citizen only exempts 
those aged over 65 and those with a physical or mental condition. All other individuals who wish to become 
British citizens must meet the requirements.
2.  Modood traces the development of British Muslim identity politics to the Satanic Verses affair, an event which 
marked a key moment when many Muslims began to think of themselves as Muslim in a public way. For a fuller 
discussion of the controversy, and the tensions between religious and cultural minorities and state secularism, 
see Modood (1990).
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3.  In this article I have only been concerned with migrants who have been recognised as having a right to remain 
in the United Kingdom. There are of course asylum seekers and undocumented migrants who do not have even 
the most basic of rights, but who are beyond the scope of this article.
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